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Abstract

Important features and the distribution of capital stock 01JDed by firms
in Pakistan's engineering industry are examined and related to capital
■arkets

with unequal access. Bankers' determination of a firm's credit

worthiness in the 'formal' capital market is analysed.

Differences in

investment behaviour conditional on borrowing arrangements are then tested
using a two stage switching regressions model with endogenous switching.

It

is concluded that firms that borrow in the 'formal' markets behave according
to the flexible accelerator model of investment while non-borrowing firms
plough back profits.

Furthermore, the former have higher capital-output

ratios and find it less difficult to adjust to their desired capital stocks
compared to the latter.

Introduction
In a developing country the decision by a firm to increase its capital
■ tock

is made, typically, in a situation where sources of credit are few and

aaounts are rationed. It is usual to classify these sources as 'formal' and
'informal' on the basis of differences in transactions and costs of
borrowing. For example, 'formal' sources such as commercial banks and
specialized lending institutions differentiate amongst borrowers on the basis
of their perception of the likely success of the enterprise within the
framework of the government's ind~strial policy.

Loans are offered to the

selected firms at subsidized interest rates and other favourable terms. Firms
that do not succeed in borrowing in the formal sector have to rely on
self-generated funds or on lenders in the informal sector who are not
costrained either by a ceiling on interest rates or by the industrial policy.
The terms on which loans are offered and access to them in the two markets
are suffiently different to think of the capital market as being
'fragmented'. We examine the impact of such 'fragmentation' on the investment
decisions of firms.
It is argued (McKinnon, 1973) that governemnt intervention in the
financial markets results in costly misallocation of capital. The 'favoured'
firms get capital often at negative real interest rates and, as a result,
tend to over capitalize which leads to exess capacity. Firms that are unable

to borrow in these markets face very high real costs of investment and are
often under capitalized. While this argument is not unchallenged at the macro
level (e.g. Leff, 1976 and Fry, 1978), there are few micro studie.s that
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examine the issues directly (a notable exception is Tybout, 1983). Our study
attempts to test hypotheses based on McKinnon's observation using firm level
evidence from Pakistan.
This evidence was collected in 1982-83 in three rounds of surveys of 119
firms manufacturing farm machinery in Pakistan. The sample constitutes 23% of
the total population of 514 firms in the industry (Pakistan Agricultural
Machinery Division Census, 1983). The objective of the surveys was to collect
data on the economic environment in which industrializati on takes place in a
developing country. It yielded detailed information on the background of
entrepreneurs, workings of the labor market and other variables capturing the
input and output decisions of firms. Five broad categories of farm machinery
are manufactured. These are tubewells, threshers, tractor attachments such as
seed and fertilizer drills and fodder cutters p sugarcane crushers. Demand
for this equipment increased rapidly in the 1970's due to the success of
'green revolution' technology and shortages of labour at peak periods of
agricultural activity. Thus the industry is a good example of the impotance
of sectoral linkages in debvelopment.

Most firms in the industry are small:

nearly 67', employ 10 or less workers (These are highly skilled workers and
are retained throughout the year. At peak periods of manufacturing activity
total work force more than doubles by hiring, in the main, unskilled
workers). The la~gest firm in the sample employs 67 workers. A notable
feature of the industry is that most firms are located in five towns in the
Punjab which are Lahore, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Daska and Mianchannu. The
last two are small rural towns that are emerging as important centres of the
engineering industry.

(The surveys and other issues in beginning

industrializati on are discussed in Nabi, 1985).
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present a discussion
of the machines and equipment used by the firms (relating it to intersectoral
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linkages hypothesis in development). This defines firms' capital stock and
enables us to examine the distribution of assets across firm size. The
capital market and its 'fragmentation' are discussed in section 3. This is

followed by an analysis in section 4 of the bankers' perception of firms'
credit worthiness and the decision to lend. Firms' investment decisions in

the light of McKinnon's arguments are investigated in section S. Additional
dirct evidence regarding the impact of 'fragmentation' on capital utilization
is presented in section 6. Finally, policy relevant concluding remarks are
presented in section 7.

Defining Capital·Stock: the machinery in use.

The thirteen categories of machines used by firms in the production
process are listed in table 1. Three categories of lathes are reported.
Lathes play an important role in the manufacturing process since the
engineering specifications are very rough so that the cast parts have to be
extensively machined before assembly. Tubewell firms which undertake
substatial casting report the highest use of all three types of lathes
fol lowed by sugar.cane crusher/ chaff cutter firms. Trolley manufacturing is
simpler and the machines required are mainly drills and welding plants. Firms
manufacturing tractor attachments such as seed~ fertilizer drills and

ploughs use the smaller lathes as well as drills and welding plants. Thresher
aanufacturers report use of the whole range of engineering machinery.
Regarding firm size, the larger firms more frequently report the use of all
machines compared to small firms except for paint spraying
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machines. More small firms report these machines partly because they
subcontract work from the large manufacturers (see Nabi,1985. on
subcontracting in the industry).
The machinery used by firms may also be distinguished on the basis of
'traditional' or 'light' machinery and 'sophisticated' or 'heavy' machinery.
The latter catogory includes machines such as powered cutting units, large
furnaces (cupolas), honing and milling machines and power presses. What
distinguishes these machines from others is that they are more expensive and
require considerable expertise in handling. Also, economies of scale are
involved in their use. Thus it can be seen in table 1 that_ mainly the large
firms own these machines along ,vi th a few small firms involed in specialized
subcontracting.
An important feature of the agricultural machinery industry in Pakistan

is that it uses indigenous engineering skills to satisfy demand generated in
the agricutural sector. An aspect of this indegeneity is the impetus that it
provides to the local engineering industry which manufactures nearly all the
thirteen categories of machines listed in table 1. This can be seen in
columns 3, 4 and 5 of table 2. Column 3 shows that nearly 25% of firms
manufacture their own machines such as plainers and furnaces while 33% report
that they manufacture their own power presses. This reflects the remarkable
technical skills of the entrepreneur/manager in the industry. The machines
embody sophisticated technology and can be used to manufacture a wide range
of engineering equipment. Column 4 and 5 show the percentage distribution of
firms (not manufacturing their own machinery) that import or purchase locally
manufactured machines. Only plainers and honing~ milling machines are

imported in meaningfully large numbers. This evidence is indicative of the
linkages that this industry forges with the engineering base in the economy

s

and in this manner contributing to balanced growth. The balanced growth
argument can, of course, be stretched too far resulting in socially expensive
import substitutio n which may burden consumers with unsatisfacto ry and
obsolete technology embodied in the domesticall y manufacture d machinery.
l'here is little evidence to support this. at least at this stage of the
engineering sophisticat ion required of the machinery. As can be seen in the
last column of table 2, nearly all the firms report that locally made macines
in all categories perform as satisfactor ily as imported machines.
In most industrial towns of the Punjab there is a lively market for 2nd
hand engin,eering machinery. This market plays an important role in beginning

industriali zation since it enables the skilled workers of large firms, who
wish to establish their own manufacturi ng units, to do so at little initial
investment in machinery. The mechanics-t urned-entre preneurs purchase the
second hand machinery, repair it to satisfactor y working order, and are
quickly in business. Column 2 of table 2 reports incidence of use of second
hand machinery in the industry. Most firms report some use of second hand
machinery. Honing f3 milling machines, for example. are mostly purchased

second hand. This enables a more widespread use of this expensive, imported
machinery than would otherwise be possible.
Table 3 enables a few comments on the vintage of the machinery in use.
Most machines are less than fifteen years old so .that the technology which
they embody is not altogether obsolete (the exception being plainers which
are mostly of 1950 vintage). This is partly accounted for by the fact that
most firms began their operations in the 1970's after the advent of 'green

revolution' which created opportuniti es in the industry. The plants that they
own, therefore, embody technologie s of recent vintage and perform
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satisfactorily for the range of agricultural machinery currently in demand.
How quickly this technology becomes obsolete will be determined by government
policy towards farm mechanization. If greater automation is promoted on the
farm by, for example, encouraging the use of reaper-binders and combine
harvestors on large farms through import and credit subsidies, the
technologies are likely to be rendered obsolete much sooner.

Section 3: The Distribution of Firm assets

Our ultimate objective in this discussion is to investigate investment
decisions by firms. To do so we examine changes in assets owned by the firms
~

in our sample. One category of assets is the value of buildings and land
belonging to the firms, and the other is the value of machinery installed in
the plant. These enable the definition of firms' capital stock. Any additions
to it that the firm makes defines investment. None of the firms reported
changes in the land area that they own. A few firms report changes in the
built up area but the values reported varied so much for the same square
footage across firms that we are reluctant to consider these data as being
reliable. The data on inventories (since changes in these would also
constitute investment) is also poor. Most firm owners report no inventories
saying that they purchase materials during the season when machine orders are

placed. Also the finished machines are not stocked for any length of time. In
most cases firms are hard pressed to meet delivery schedules of orders
already placed. Thus we find that the most satisfactory definition of firms'
capital stock or fixed assets is the value of machinery owned by firms.
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n.e easier part in evaluating machinery is the head count since machines
are in.stalled in an open, accessible, part of the factory. The make,
specification and vintage of machines is also easy to determine (and is
presented in tables 1-3). The difficult part, however, is to assign values to
■achiaes
■arket

of different vintage and specification. To do this we approached the

for second hand machinery and after detailed discussions with

commission agents (who facilitate the exchange of second hand machinery), in
each of the towns where firms are located, we were able to assign 1982 prices
to the machines owned by firms. Thus we are confident about the quality of

data regarding firm assets or capital stock measured as value of machinery
owned. Investment_ is defined as changes in this measure of capital stock
throaghout the discussion that follows.
Table 4 presents the distribution of assets among the sampled firms.

Sinall firms (employing 10 workers or less) constitute 66'- of the sample and
own 3511, of the assets. Large firms ( employing more than 10 worke.rts)
constitute the remaining 34% of the sample and own 65% .of the assets. Thus
the value of assets per large firm (Rs 2,04,431) is nearly four times that of
small firms Rs(9,56,256). The value of assets per firm is highest for
sugarcane crusher/chaff cutter firms (Rs 2,33,932) followed by Thresher firms
(Rs 1,34,429). Tubewell firms (Rs 1,08,270), Trolley firms (Rs 82,771) and
Tractor attachment firms (Rs37,675). The low value of machinery for the last
category of firms partly explains why it is easy to set up such units even in
small rural towns.
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Table !:Machinery in use by product group and firm size

(percentage)

Machines

All Firms

1

2

3

4

5

6

Upto Sft

62 (1.35)

72

46

21

28

50

41

56

S-8 ft

71 (1.85)

96

76

21

78

so

63

85

)8

61 (1. 89)

92

65

14

94

6

49

85

Shapers

S3 {1.30)

72

50

14

100

12

39

81

Plainers

3 (1.25)

8

2

0

6

0

1

7

100 (2.11) 100

100

100

100

83

100

100

7

Lathes

ft

Drills
Grinders

47 (1. 4S)

40

44

36

83

33

31

S4

Welding Plants

69 (2 .4S)

8

100

100

78

S6

68

71

Paint Spraying units

10 (1.25)

0

2

36

6

28

14

2

Powered cutting units

1S {1.17)

4

26

29

0

6

s

24

Furnaces

20 (1. 67)

4

13

7

83

6

8

44

3 {1.00)

4

0

14

0

6

s

0

18 (1.52}

0

26

7

28

17

8

34

Honing J3 Milling machines
Power presses
Notes:

1. Tubewells

S.Tractor attachments

2.Threshers

3. Trolleys

6.Small firms

4.Sugarcane/chaff cutters

7.Large firms.

Figures in brackets are the average number of machines for firms that own
those machines. The total number of firms in the sample is 119.
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(percentage)

Table 2: Origin of machinery as reported by firms
1

2

3

4

s

upto 5ft

40

7

2

91

98

S-8 ft

46

11

0

89

99

> 8ft

56

8

1

91

99

Shapers

41

10

3

87

98

0

25

25

so

100

Drills

46

8

2

90

100

Grinders

25

7

0

93

100

Welding Plants

30

5

2

91

100

8

8

0

92

100

Powered cutting units

17

11

6

83

100

Furnaces

12

25

0

75

100

75

0

25

75

100

19

33

0

67

100

Machines
Lathes

Plainers

Paint Spraying units

Honing

~

Milling machines

Power presses

Notes. 1.Second-hand

2.0wn-made

imported machines of same quality.

3.Iinported

4.Locally made

5.local and
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Table 3: Machinery vintage: Year of purcahase reported by firms (percantages)
Machines

Before 1950

1951-60

1961-70

1971-77

1978-82

Lathes
upto 5ft

5

7

17

38

33

S-8 ft

11

5

7

41

36

> 8ft

12

8

13

33

34

Shapers

13

7

13

35

32

Plainers

75

0

0

25

0

Drills

8

6

11

33

42

Grinders

4

11

9

20

71

Welding Plants

3

5

5

35

53

Paint Spraying units

0

0

9

20

71

Powered cutting units

6

0

6

35

53

21

13

8

29

29

0

25

0

50

25

20

5

5

50

20

Furnaces
Honing f3 Milling machines
Power presses

Table 4.

Size of Fira

ot Group
N11111ter of Pina• and Value of Aueti l by Fina She an4 By Procl'il

Tubew ell En1ine
No. of Value of
Finaa Aneta

'Thres her Finat
No. of
Firaa

Value of
Aneta

Trolle y Fina•
No. of Value of
Fina• Assets

Tracto r Attach ment
No. of

Fira1

Value of
Auets

Su1aroane Crush er
Chaff C~tt1 r Fim1
No. of

Fina•

Value of
Aueh

'740300

All Fira1
No. of Value of
Fira1 Aneta

79

4444246

22

1530386

25

833900

13

818860

14

520800

5

Col1UDD
Percen ta1e

88

67

54

16

93

82

88

86

22

21

66

35

Row Percen tage

28

34

31

19

18

18

18

12

5

17

100

100

21

4408866

1

174400

2

82000

13

2'768688

40

8177252

Small

(10 worke rs
or leu)

Large
(More than
10 worke rs)

3

743298

12

33

46

84

7

. 18

12

14

78

79

34

65

8

9

52

54

2

2

5

1

33

34

100

100

Total No. of
firms

25

2273684

46

3508988

119

12621498

Row Peroen ta1e

21

18

39

Column
Percen tage
Row percen tage

5242766
42

14

993260

16

602800 .

18

12

8

13

s

15

28

-

C>.

p
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Section 3: The Capital Market.

In Pakistan financial intermediation by the government began in the late
1950's as part of the policy to promote import-substitu tion. Several
specialized credit institutions such as the Investment Corporation of
Pakistan, Pakistan Industrial Development Bank, Pakistan Industrial
Development Corporation and Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment
Corporation were established to engage in lending programs within the
framework of a detailed industrial policy of the government. Most of these
institutions lend to the private sector ventures which fall within the
government's investment licensing policy. Thus according to the Pakistan
Economic Survey (Ministry of Finance, 1983-84) •investment licensing aims to
allocate investment funds in accordance with government priorities•. In
1983-84 total loans sanctioned by these institutions were Rs 4007 .12 million
which amounted to nearly 62% of the value of capital formation in the private
industrial sector. In the context of farm machinery industry which only
recently gained recoganition by the government as an industry with a
considerable potential for growth, this policy resulted in a highly
fragmented capital market which may have influenced the investment decisions
of firms a la McKinnon.
Firm owners in our sample identify four sources of credi_t. These are:

The formal capital market
This consists of commercial banks and, more recently, some of the
specialized lending institutions mentioned above. The most active of these
institutions is Pakistan Industrial Development Bank. Firms report
considerable difficulty in obtaining funds from these sources since
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collateral requirements are strict and scruitiny procedures require enormous
paper work which many -of the small firms in the industry are unable to cope
with. Also repayment schedules are stringent with little possibility of

rolling forward. These features reflect high effective interest rates.
Nominal interest rates (between 12% and 14%) charged, however, are reported
to be attractive particularly in view of an inflation rate of 16~ in this
period.

The informal capital market
The most widespread arrangement here is the "committee" or the "chit"
system. "Cominitte" members usually belong to the same biradri (which helps to
avoid -default since few will risk biradri boycott which affects wider social
interaction). Monthly instalments are pooled together and then lots are drawn
to deterimine the queue for allocating the pooled sum. It is common that
those in front of the queue sell their pool to those behind at a premium
decided through open bidding. According to some estimates the premium, or the
real rate of interest, on such transactions varies between lS'll and 20%. A
"committee" may last upto two years depending on the ntiJDber of mambers and
the size and frequency of the draws. The pooled sum can be as high as
Rsl00,000 depending on the town (higher figures are reported in Faisalabad,
an industrial town with considerable entrepreneurial opportunities). Most
entrepreneurs report that funds obtained through the committe system are used
mainly as working capital since repayments have to be made frequently and the
average duration of the committe is rather brief.

Other informal 'back street' arrangements operated by commision agents
also exist but the sums involved are small and repayments have to be made

over a short period, so that these sources are also used to finance working
capital rather than the purchase of machinery.
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Self-generated funds:
This is the most frequently reported alternative to the formal capital
markets for financing the purchase of machinery.

Self-generated funds are

defined rather broadly and include firm's own savings as well as borrowing
from friends and relatives. The latter have become particularly important
since the 1970's due to the large inflow of overseas remittances from
migrants working in the gulf. (In 1982 remittances peaked at U.S. $3 billion
which amounted to nearly 10% of Pakistan's gnp). Direct evidence of
remittances being invested in the industry is hard to obtain. However, it was
frequently reported that many of the friends and relatives from whom the
firms borrow have Middle East connections. Firms are reluctant to divulge
information regarding the terms of such transactions. We were told that the
only condition of borrowing is to pay back the principal in a reasonable
period of time.

Other sources
Important among these are raw material wholesellers since they defer
payments on material advanced till after the manufactured machinery has been
sold. Similarly advances from customers enable firms to meet their immediate
financial commitments. These arrangements are also mainly for meeting working
capital requirements rather than for investing in machinery.

Advances on raw

materials may, of course, be important for those who manufacture their own
machines. However, the total value of self made machinery is a small

proportion of the total value of machinery owned by firms.
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The discussion above of the capital market faced by the agricultura l
machinery industry indicates the nature of fragmentatio n in the capital
market. Several sources are available involving different terms of lending.
Also access to these sources is differentia ted by firm and owner
characteris tics. The most desirable sources for the firms, given the loan
repayment period and other terms, are those identified as belonging to the
formal sector but the funds available here are limited and, because market
clearing interest rates are not allowed to prevail, they are rationed.
Credit rationing may be considered to result from the capital market in
disequilibri um since interst rates, often becuase of government policy, are
not allowed to clear the market so that agents operate off their offer
curves. This, as McKinnon has argued, leads to allocative inefficienc ies. A
somewhat different view of rationing is taken by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
They argue that rationing may come about because lenders view it as a
mechanism for arriving at 'equilibrium ' in their lending programs. It is
at'.gued that the interest rate is not like any other price in that it involves
future returns to loans rather than exchange value at a point in time. It is
this feature of interest rates that affects the lender's ability to recover
loans and avoid default. For example, distinguish ing borrowers by bidding up
the interest rate is likely to result in adverse selection, i.e., borrowers
that undertake more risky investments are likely to bid higher interest rates
and this increases the probability of default. Thus lenders may choose to
keep interest rates below the market clearing rate and resort to rationing
using various screening devices to lower the risk of default. In the next

section an attempt is made to identify some of the screening devices used by
banks to select their borrowers in the farm machinery industry.

1S
Section 4: Determining a firm's credit worthiness.
All 119 firms in the sample reported that they had applied for loans in
the formal capital market sometime in the last five years. However, only 43
firms reported suuccess in borrowing. The rest had to rely on a combination
of sources such as self generated funds and friends and relatives. A careful
examination of firms that succeed in borrowing suggests the following. The
typical borrowing firm manufactures threshers and is likely to be located in
a small town like Daska or Mianchannu. The owner of the firm belongs to the
'lohar' bradri, is well educated and, surprisingly, has fewer years of
experience in this or related business compared to the unsuccessful
borrowers. The firm also has a larger value of capital stock and profits
compared to others. These features of the successful firms in our sample are
summarized in tables Sand 6.
How do these features contribute in assuring bank managers that loan
applicants having them are less likely to default compared to others? Let us
take product specialization. Thresher manufacturers have enjoyed high growth
and profits in the recent past because farmer demand is high and is likely to
continue to grow in the near future. There is considerable scope for
innovation and thus for product differentiation and secure markets) to suite
the climatic conditions of different regions. All this indicates that
thresher firms are likely to have relatively high rates of returns and thus
are less likely to default. Being located in small towns like Mianchannu and
Daska may contribute to succeess in borrowing because the few bank branches

in these towns enjoy monopoly in lending to successful ventures and branch
managers have good knowledge of the likely success of ventures. 'Lohar'

biradri is a proxy for the pool of engineering skills that an entrepreneur is
likely to inherit or acquire through association, which contributes to his
success. Education may help in smoother transactions with
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applicants and may also be a proxy for the more general ability to acquire
nn skills and succeed. Firms with large initial stock of capital are more
likely to succeed in borrowing because banks may regard it as indicative of
suecess in the ·past. It also serves as good collateral.
To evaluate the statistical importance of these variables in determining
success in borrowing, the following 'credit worthiness' equation is

estimated;

B = f(past capital stock, past profits, years in business, education,
lohar dummy, thresher dlJlllllly, location dummy)
where Bis a dummy variable taking value 1 for success in borrowing and 0
otherwise. Thus the ordinary least squares method is inappropriate (Maddala,
1983). Instead, we use probit which involves the maximum likelihood
procedure, assuming the normal distribution for the error term.

Results

The estimates on the coefficients along with their standard errors are
reported in table 7. The statistically significant variables are firm's
profits, entrepreneur's education, 'lobar' entrepreneurs, firm's product
specialization (thresher manufacturers) and being based in small towns like
Daska and Mianchannu. Firm's past capital stock is on the border line of

significance while entrepreneur's business experience is insignificant. We
••ed different versions of this variable (e.g. the quadratic form and dummies
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using different cut-off points) but none of these were significant. Some of
the borrowers in the sample have technical education and we tried dummies
based on this variable but these were also insignificant.
An explanation for why our results indicate that past business experience

is not given much weight by lenders may be as follows: A large number of
firms were established in the 1970's when this industry's growth potential
was clearly perceived. As a result, many entrepreneurs with success in other
ventures (for example crop trading in small rural towns) moved in. Thus, even
though these entrepreneurs have only a few years of experience in this
industry, their entrepreneurial performance elsewhere has been demonstratably
impressive. Banks lend to them more readily compared to those who have had
long experience in this industry but have performed less impressively.
Unfortunately we do not have data on business exdperience elsewhere to obtain
a true measure of length of experience. (This variable may also reflect plant
vintage. An alternative, firm age, but was statistically insignificant).
We may comment on the explanatory power of our credit worthiness equation
by evaluating its success in matching the predicted status of a firm
regarding borrowing with its observed status. To do this probit estimates of
the coefficients on variables in the equation are converted into
probabilities (using standard probit-probability tables) for each firm in the
sample. This yields the estimated probability of a firm's success in
borrowing. Taking the cut-off point to be 0.5, the results are reported in
table 8. Our model of credit worthiness correctly predicts the borrowing
status of firms in 83.1~ of the cases.
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Table 5: Characteristics of Borrowers in 'Formal' Capital Markets

Percentages

Total
Successful Borrowers

(36)

43

Of Whom

Thresher manufacturers

36

86

(3 9)

Located in Daska and Mianchannu

26

61

(34)

'Lohars'

24

56

(59)

Note: Percentages in brackets are based on total (119) firms while others are
percentages of firms that are successful in borrowing.

Table 6: Other Variables Important in Bankers' Lending Decision
Borrowers
Education (years)
Past Capital Stock (Rs)
Past profits (Rs)
Years in this Business

(Means)

Non Borrowers

7.22

6.024

94,820.17

71. 386 .oo

237.190.00

117.100

9.32

10.276
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Table 7: Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Bankers' Lending Decision.

Exogenous Variables

Standard Errors

Coefficients

Past Capital Stock (Rs*lOOO)

0.0338

0.0181

Past profits (Rs•lOOO)

0.0041

0.0021

Entrepreneur's Business Experience (years)

-0.0169

0.0182

'Lobar' Entrepreneurs (dummy)

0.0705

0.0212

Product Specialization (Thresher dummy)

1.3788

0.3212

Small Industrial Town Location (dummy)

0.6124

0.31S8

-1. 8731

0.4172

Constant
Log Likelihood

-56.S18

N

119

Dmnmy Dependent variable = 1 if banks lend, 0 otherwise.
Notes;

1. The towns are Mianchannu and Daska.
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Table 8: The Credit Worthiness Models Success in Predicting Firm's Status

Observed status

Predicted status
Will Borrow

Successful firms

Wil 1 Not Borrow

43

29

13

76

6

70

+

Unsuccessful firms

Percentage of successful and unsuccessful borrowers whose predicted status
matches with their observed status = 83.19 (with cut-off point at 0.5).
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Section 5:

Investment Decisions

In this section we examine investment decisions in the context of the
capital markets discussed in the last two sections.

The total investment

undertaken by firms between 1980-82 is reported in Table 9.

The first three

rows in the table present averages over the entire sample of 119 firms while
the last three rows present averages for the investing firms only.
features of the table merit comment.

Two

Firstly. 6 firms that were successful

in borrowing from banks did not report any investment between 1980-82.

This

was because even though they had secured loans towards the end of 1981. they
had not actually committed these at the time of interviews.

The second

feature is that firms that are successful in borrowing invest nearly twice as
much as the unsuccessful firms.

But they do have considerably larger past

capital stocks so that their investment as a proportion of past capital stock
is only 64% that of non-borrowers.

This suggests that the latter firms. when

they have growth potential. are able to realize it by raising loans in the
informal sector or by ploughing back past profits.

In the discussion that

follows we attend to these issues in more detail invoking the theory of
investment in imperfect capital markets.

The Theory
McKinnon's argument regarding the impact of government intervention and
credit rationing on firm's investment behavior can be seen in terms of an
additional constraint on firms' welfare maximizing behavior.

With subsidized

interest rates. the firm perceives returns to its investment opportunities to

be higher than the cost of borrowing and therefore a non-rationed firm will
undertake the investment.

A rationed firm. on the other hand. if it is to

invest in that activity, will be required by its owners to demonstrate
somewhat higher returns (compared to the non-rationed firm) before releasing
funds.
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Table 9:

Total Investment Undertaken by Firms Between
1980-1982 (Rs).

Firms Investing

Mean Investment

Investment~
Past Capital Stock

All Firms

64

8,258.60

0.18

Banl Borrowers

43

17.229.00

0.23

Non-Borrowers

76

3.605.00

0.15

Investing Firms

64

15,857.81

0.33

37

20,022.97

0.27

27

10,150.00

0.42

Bank Borrowers

Non-Borrowers
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The firm (manager) thus will perceive the opportunity cost of investment to

have increased.

This is the cost effect of rationing.

Further, a severely

rationed firm - one that has no access to the formal market at all -

may have

to rely entirely on its own liquidity (self-generated funds) to undertake
investment.

This may be considered the liquidity effect of rationing.

A

formal argument incorporating the cost and liquidity effects may be developed
as follows (for the full discussion see Tybout, 1983).
Abstracting from uncertainty, a firm's earnings from additions to capital
stock, given product and factor prices and assuming neoclassical production
technology, aay be written as:

n = n (t, k) where nk) 0 and nkk

< O,

(1)

where n is earnings and tis time.
Capital accumulation also imposes costs on the firm which are greater, the
more rapid is capital accumulation.
instantaneous investment at level

i

Thus we may write the cost of
=Ito be

C = C(I) where C(O) = 0 and C', C"

>0

(2)

Now a welfare maximizing firm takes into account (1), (2) and the discount
rate of earnings, r, in arriving at its optimal investment path, I(t), which is
'

given by the Euler condition

nk

(t,

k)

= r C'(I) -

.

(3)

C"(I) I

(Eisner and Strotz 1963, Lucas, 1967).

Assuming relative prices to be constant

this implies a flexible accelerator model of investment:
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I(t)

=

(4)

p[k• - k(t)]

with k• satisfying nk (k•)

=

r C'(O) and

2
(k*)/C•(O)}
l {r - r - 2 n
kk
2

(5)

The effect of credit rationing is that firms perceive the opportunity cost
of capital to have increased so that earnings are discounted at a higher rate.
Thus rationed firms will exhibit higher marginal products of capital.

Also

· they will be slow to adjust their capital stock to the desired level i.e.

i

< 0.

This is the cost effect of rationing resulting from government

intervention in the' capital market.
To incorporate the liquidity effect we invoke the large body of literature
on productivity changes which shows that small firms have lower capital output
ratios compared to large firms.
reinvested in the business.

This yields larger investable surplus which is

[The importance of liquidity in determining

investment also appears in the context of developed countries (e.g. Meyer and

Kuh. 1958; Lintner, 1967 and Hand. 1968).]

Such liquidity is vital in the

investment decisions of firms that are severely rationed in the official
market.

Thus we argue that firms with little or no access to the 'formal'

capital market invest all current profits.

I(t)

= C-l

[n(t}]

lf the firm is severely rationed, it behaves a-0cording to (6), otherwise
according to (4).

(6)
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Given the theoretical framework above, empirically examining McKinnon's
argument amounts to testing which of the two sets, the flexible accelerator or
the profit, of variables explain the behavior of firms with unequal access to
the capital market.

The empirical model is:

(7)

where Qt is expected output, aQt is desired capital stock and Ut is the error
term.

A Switching Regressions Model:
In order estimate the investment model of equation 7 we use a procedure
which incorporate s information on bank's lending decision and then examines
differences in investment behaviour. This is the two stage switching
regressions model with endogenous switching (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1973; Lee,
1978; Trost, 1977; Maddala and Nelson, 1975).

The two regimes describing the

investment behaviour of borrowing and non-borrowi ng firms respectivel y are:

iff yZ.

1

iff yZ.

1

2.

< U.1

Ui are assumed to be correlated with

U.

1

(1)

(2)

u1 i and u2 i and this_is what enables the

endogen ous switchi ng in the model.

1 if yZi

Ii=
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We define a dummy variab le I.1 such that

2. Ui
(3)

0 otherw ise

(3) is the criteri on functio n that yields regimes (1) and (2).
We normal ize var (U1 )

=

1 and that Uii'

u21 and

U have a trivari ate
1

normal distrib ution with me an zero and covaria nce matrix
2
al

l

(J'12

(1.

1U

'2

=

(J'2

(4)

CJ'2u
1

(4)
The likelih ood functio n for the statist ical model outline d in (1) to

is

=

[f'i

I·1

1-I·

[J
ai

g(yi - P1Xti• Ui) du]

-a>

F(yi - P2X2i, Ui)dui]

'YZi

ns of
where g and fare, respec tively, the bivaria te normal density functio

Maximi zing (5) is cumbers ome.

Lee (1976) sugges ts a simple r alterna tive.

The objecti ve is to obtain the expecte d values of

u1 i

and

u2 i

in (1) and

(2) where:

E(U11·1u1.

i

and E (U2.1

yZ.)
1

= E(al U u.1 I U.(
1-

I ui -> yZ.)
1

=

yZ.)
1

E(s2 Uu.1

=

I u.1 2.

-CJlu

o(yZ

) i)

i (yZ )i
yZ.)

1

1 - I (yZ )i

1

(5)
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We define Wli = 6(yZi)/i(yZi) and W i =
2

i(yZ.)/1-i(yZ.) and this
1
1

enables us to write (1) and (2) as

for I. = 1

(6)

for Ii= 0

(7)

1

where the residuals

The two stage procedure for estimating (6) and (7) is to first estimate (3)
using probit maximum likelihood (which we have already done in section 4).
This enables estimation of the Mill's ratios,

w1 i

and

w2 i,

involving 6 and

i, the distribution and density functions, respectively, of the standard

normal.

Ordinary least squares may then be used to estimate (6) and (7).

Using this procedure we obtain the results reported in Table 10.
The results are broadly in agreement with those of Table 10.

The

coefficients on the accelerator model are statistically significant for the
borrowers but not for the non-borrowers.

As before, the coefficient on profits

is highly significant for non-borrowers but it is insignificant for the
borrowers.

The relative values of~ for the two groups show that the

borrowers find it easier to adjust to their desired capital stock.

We have

additional information regarding variables that influence firms' investment
decisions.

Both amongst borrowers and non-borrowers thresher aanufacturers

invest more than others which reflects the growth in demand for threshers in
Pakistan's changing agriculture.
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Table 10.

Investment Decisions. Two stage Switching
Regressions Model. Dependent Variable: Investment in
( all firms)
Rupees.

Borrowers (I=l)

Borrowers {I=0)

Value of output (ap)

0.039
(0.0ll)C

0.017
(0.019)

Value of Past Capital Stock(p)

-0.368
(0.20l)b

-0.170
(0.213)

Profits h1)

0.021
(0.314)

0.093
(0.014)C

Previous Years in Business (6)

2211.00
1188.21)a

Entrepreneurs' &lucation (A1)

-7342.10
(4387 .3) a

621.129
(423.54)
638.267
(504.239)

1298.13
611.17)b

14~992.26
(7522. 20)

Small Town Dummy (Ag)

8719. 00
(3719.00)C

23. 43 8
(3638.31)

Mills Ratio (a)

12400.00
(7317.00)a

-2950.51
(1141.00)

Thresher Dummy (A2)

-10502.00
( 5 8748)

Constant
R2
N

Notes:

0. 432

-5930. 90
(1023 .11)

0.191
43

76

Standard errors are in parentheses. a, band c imply lOIJJ,
levels of significance respectively.

~

and 1%
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The results regarding the coefficients on Mill's ratios are also
interesting. They indicate that borrowers invest more than average and
non-borrowers less. This result brings out more clearly Mckinon's arguments
concerning the impact of imperfect capital markets on investment decisions and
thus justifies the two stage regression procedure that was used.

Section 7:

Summary and Conclusions

The principal objective in this paper was to investigate the difference in
investment behaviour of firms with unequal access to the captal markets.

We

defined capital stock in terms of the value of machinery owned by the firm and
observed that a considerably greater proportion of equipment owned by large
firms is expensive and sophisticated compared to small firms.

Further, the

market for 2nd hand machinery is fairly active and many firms manufacture their
own machinery.

Most firms use locally made machinery of a relatively recent

vintage (1970's).

Regarding the distribution of assets, we observed that 66%

of the firms employing 10 workers or less own 35% of the assets while 33~ of
the large firms employing 11 or more workers own 65% of the assets.

Part of

the explanation for this distribution is the unequal access to capital markets.
Small firms are severely rationed in the 'formal' capital market and rely on
informal sources, such as the 'committee' or 'chit' system, or on their past
profits for investment.

This is because bankers in the 'formal' market attach

greater risk to lending to such firms.
We examined the theory of credit rationing and related it to the observed
behaviour of bankers in determining a firm's credit worthiness.

We note that

in the absence of complete information, bankers attach importance to such
observable features of firms as past capital stock and profits, entrepreneurs'
education and biradri and product specialization.
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It appears that firms based in small rural towns are more successful in
borrowing in the 'formal' market perhaps because bank branches are few and
aanagers can easily spot firms likely to succeed.

Regarding investment decisions we hypothesized that firms that can borrow
successfully in the 'formal' capital markets behave according to the standard
flexible accelerator model of investment, while those unable to borrow simply
invest past profits.

This argument is statistically tested using a two stage

switching regressions model with a criterion function that enables endogenous
switching.

The results show that borrowing firms invest more, have a higher

capital-output ratio and find it less difficult to adjust to their desired
capital stock compared to non-borrowing firms.

Additionally, we find that

firms that have growth potential invest more than others regardless of whether
or not they have access to the 'formal' markets.
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